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Abstract 
This paper studies the relationship between the features of managerial board, ownership structure and firm performance of a 
particular type of new technology ventures: the academic spin offs. These are mainly small and medium firms, focused on high 
technology, research and innovation, that involve private and public actors in their ownership structure. Literature shows that 
these firms play an important role for economic growth of a country, however in Italy a high degree of academic spin offs doesn’t 
survive for a long time. Managerial competences, corporate governance attributes and financial structure could explain these 
phenomenon. This study observes a sample of Italian academic spin offs established in the last five years: primary data on 
corporate governance, industry, ownership structure, financial aspects are taken from the National Register of Firms, University 
(parent organization) and company website. Statistics show relevant relations between firm performance and corporate 
governance attributes and confirmed, after the start-up, the inefficiency of the board of directors in which there is an overlapping 
between academic-founder and manager, suggesting greater openness to outside expertise. 
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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1. Introduction  
Composition, managerial style and competences are important elements for the efficiency of managerial board 
and for the firm performance. During the last decade, research on corporate governance shown that the real problem, 
for a good governance practice, is linked more to the access to critical resources that to agency conflicts between 
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ownership and management (Van Gils, 2005; Roe 1994). Strategic and managerial competences of CEO, financial 
resources and partnerships are strategic for the development of the firms (James, 1999; Bianco and Casavola, 1999), 
especially in those contexts where competitiveness is based upon knowledge and innovation and where capital 
markets are not very developed and not very dynamics. In knowledge-intensive sectors, also attribute of corporate 
governance may represent critical resources, able to influence the firm performance and its survival (Renders et al, 
2010). For this reason designing the structures of governance, the primary goal becomes searching for more 
effective solutions to engage stakeholder who bring expertise, critical know-how, financial resources and strategic 
relations (Rajan and Zingales, 2000). Small and medium enterprises are the most representative firm model in Italy, 
where the corporate governance structure presents a high degree of ownership concentration, CEO duality and 
overlapping between manager and founder. These features reduce the agency problems, but bring out the need to 
have extensive knowledge and expertise, in order to have a rapid, efficient and flexible decision-making process, 
considering the actual challenges of enterprises, especially within dynamic sectors. Based on resource dependency 
theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), this study analyzes a particular type of SME: the academic spin offs. These are 
technology or research-based ventures, that involve private and public actors in their ownership structure, where 
there is often an overlap between the roles of founder, manager and academic researcher, who continues to carry out 
its research activities within the university, reconciling with great difficulty the managerial duties. This research 
focuses on the relations between the corporate governance features and the economic performance of academic spin-
offs after the start-up phase, when  management expertise and research funding are crucial for the development of 
these firms and, consequently, for their survival. The structure of the paper is as follows: in section 2 we describe 
the features of academic spin off; in section 3 we present the role of corporate governance in ASOs and we develop 
the hypotheses of this study;  in section 4 we present the research model, variables and sample; in section 5 we show 
the empirical results and then we discuss the main finding and draw some conclusion. 
 
2. Academic spin off 
Academic spin-off (ASO) is a specific type of new technology venture, that involve stakeholders and resources of 
both public and private nature and which are given the ambitious function of promoting local development by 
national research policies. Some authors identify a spin-off as the result of a parent organization active in research 
and development, such as Universities, University Research Centres, laboratories and private research organizations 
(Wright et al., 2007). ASO is an autonomous structure, nor a subsidiary of the parent organization, that exploit 
knowledge produced by academic research in a profit perspective, excluding non-profit organizations (Pirnay et al., 
2003 Shane, 2004). These firms, in contrast to others original start-ups, represent an innovative way of transfer of 
research results to a productive and independent business (Robert and Malone, 1996), in which university provides, 
in the start-up phase, specialized services, expertise, technical equipment, financial resources. Others authors define 
academic spin-off as a company that was born from researchers that aims to broaden their skills and abilities through 
the development of research within the university environment (Conti et al., 2010) and that, for these reason, may 
involve in the ownership structure the university with a minority equity stake. Some authors (Fryges and Wright, 
2014) distinguish between pure academic spin off and a hybrid type: pure ASO  includes only academic founders 
that continue to work part-time for the university (parent organization), while in the hybrid type the team of 
founders includes university researchers and outsiders with entrepreneurial experience. In some cases the founder-
researcher left the university for the private-profit activity and this is considered a potential career path for the 
researcher; in other case, spin offs creation is a strategic milestone for the career path within the academic context. 
These motivations affect on the firm performance and on the survival rate of ASOs, together with the business 
model of these ventures. Literature distinguishes the product-oriented spin offs from research spin offs as a 
subcategory of new technology ventures and makes a distinction between firms able to attract management 
capabilities in the founding team and firms founded by individual researchers. In this last case, the managerial style 
and the objectives are the results of personal interests of academic inventor, who wants, first of all, to complete their 
research project and to increase their independence within scientific community. Grandi and Grimaldi (2005) show 
that market orientation and managerial competences of founders are determinants for a successful industrial 
innovation, especially when the business idea don’t come from the market, but from the availability of scientific and 
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technological knowledge (Schmookler, 1966; Rothwell, 1992). Stankiewicz (1994) defines the research based spin 
offs mainly service firms, while the technology spin offs were more product oriented or addressed to sold their 
technologies through licences. In the first case, some studies show that most ASOs tend to be mostly individual 
enterprises or SMEs and, in different European countries, these firms don’t grow (Autio and Lumme, 1998, Chiesa 
and Piccaluga, 2000, Wtterwulghe, 1998). Different conditions can explain the low degree of growth: sometimes the 
business idea is linked to a weak technology or a contingent research, that make difficult to identify different 
applications useful for the market; some business are not able to attract financial resources, especially the venture 
capitalists, who don’t prefer to invest in companies where the managerial team is formed only by researchers 
without business experience (Mustar et al., 2006); often ASOs tend to establish scientific collaborations that don’t 
contribute to sales growth and to business idea development. In Italy, about the 80% of ASOs was born during the 
last decade (Piccaluga and Balderi, 2007), but most of them show criticisms in term of growth, survival and 
competitiveness (Piccaluga and Balderi, 2006; Netval, 2012; Corsi and Di Berardino, 2013). For this reason 
academic entrepreneurs, in order to obtain strategic resources and missing competences, establish interactions with 
external stakeholders, though their personal scientific collaborations and the involvement within the managerial 
board or in the ownership structure (Grandi and Grimaldi, 2003). Important stakeholders are the universities, that 
play the role of parent organization, industrial and market partnerships, scientific networks, customers, venture 
capitalists and other investors. An important challenge for ASO is to manage uncertainties and costs related to the 
acquisition of crucial resources from the environment and corporate governance structure could reduce the problem 
of access to strategic resources. Some studies show, in fact, that the improvement of business performance depends 
on the central position of the enterprise within a network of managers (Zona and Gnan, 2009); this network results 
from the capacity of the enterprise to organize its relations according to the dependencies started in the past. This 
phenomenon is, however, examined making often reference to the combinations between industries and credit 
institutions, considering as critical the dependency on financial resources only (Grandi and Grimaldi, 2003).  
3. The role of corporate governance structure within ASO 
The debate on the successful factors of ASOs is very broad. Conventionally, knowledge is the main resources 
together with financial funding and instrumental assets. Few studies observe corporate governance as a critical 
resource, considering that issue irrelevant, given that in ASOs there is often the overlap between ownership and 
control that reduce the agency problems and that these ventures don’t expose themselves to financial markets. 
Within ASO the academic inventor is the main shareholder and, considering his financial ties and the higher risk 
assumed, he is also responsible for managing the company. In this process, however, the inventor combines business 
activity with the academic role, managing simultaneously scientific and business relations. This requires different 
skills, ranging acquired by inserting in the board of directors also outside managers, university administrative staff, 
professionals with long managerial experience, delegates of institutional investors. Therefore, in ASOs the 
governance structure evolve over time, so as to enable the enterprise to gain access to critical resources and to 
involve them in the managerial board. According to resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), in 
this study we emphasize the role played by the composition of managerial board for the access to the resources 
missing within the firm, considering that in Italy financial markets are not dynamic of and this situation obliges the 
enterprises to establish strong ties with specific external stakeholders. The management skills are essential in order 
to promote the business growth and the competitiveness. Financial partners, other firms and faculty members are the 
critical suppliers that academic inventor involve in the ownership structure of ASO and, sometimes, in the board of 
directors. Stakeholders that give unique and irreplaceable resources may influence the decision-making process and 
the firm performance and for these reasons they must have the right to govern the enterprise and must take 
responsibility for negative performance. Governance problem is attract for a long time a team of strategic 
stakeholders, creating corporate governance structure able to manager different interests: academic founders, 
university, commercial partners, managers, investors. Within ASOs, the academic inventor assure the core 
competences in the first stage of entrepreneurial process; however the development of ASOs in new markets 
requires specific strategic skills and financial resources. The funding gap is often exceeded by inserting institutional 
investors within the ownership structure, but if there is a strategic gap, then comes the need to involve outsider 
managers on the board of directors, redefining the structure of the managerial team, in order to make it more 
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efficient and free up the academic-inventor from managerial issue, engaging him only on scientific activities. 
However, in Italian SMEs we find often the CEO duality practice, in which the owner serving both as a firm’s CEO 
and board chair. Literature disagrees on the effect of CEO duality on company performance: researches based on 
agency theory show a negative impact of this unity of power (Rechner and Dalton, 1991); stewardship theory argues 
that CEO duality improve decisions and the performance (Donaldson and Davis, 1991) Other authors argues that 
there is no relation between CEO duality and firm performance (Baliga et Al., 1996, Dalton et al., 1998). Boyd 
(1995) suggests that CEO duality is important in presence of resource scarcity and environmental dynamism, in 
which the concentration of power is crucial to attract for a long time investors, outside manager, scientific partner. 
Generally, a firm which practices CEO duality has a smaller percentage of outside directors, but is more likely to 
have an assertive board with a substantial presence of outside managers (Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994). Other 
important variables to explain the relation between corporate governance and firm performance are the size of board 
and the presence of women. Some authors (Hillman et al., 2000) argues that women into the board give a broader 
view of business issues, more inclusive of social and relational issues. Moreover, women has a more participatory 
and democratic management style, that improves the communication and makes it more efficient the decision-
making, especially when it involves different managers. About the size of the board, some studies suggest that with 
a few board members are more efficient because it reduces the agency problems but these board are inefficient when 
the company wants to grow, and thus lack the necessary skills. According with this assumption, the characters of the 
ownership structure could explain how the academic inventor aims to close the skills gap without sacrificing its 
power. Given these remarks, we can formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hp1) there is a negative relations between CEO duality and the performance of ASO;  
Hp2) there is a negative relations between the presence of academic-founder into the board of director and firm 
performance; 
Hp3) there is a positive relations between the presence of outside managers into the board of director and firm 
performance; 
Hp4) there is a positive relations between a mixed ownership structure (academic founder, parent organizations, 
enterprises, venture capitalists..) and firm performance. 
4. Research Model: methodology, sample and variables 
This research analyses a sample of Italian ASOs established in 2010, taken from the database of National 
Network of Italian Academic Spin Offs and Patents (Netval). This analysis considers the performance after the start-
up phase, when generally spin off fail. Data were collected through documental analysis referred to 2015 and the 
content analysis approach: information related to business performance and corporate governance was obtained 
from the national register of Italian companies (Infocamere), from company website and form the national minister 
of research and university (MIUR); data related to economic and financial performance has been extracted from 
AidaBvdep system. Initially the analysis extracted 80 firms, but 13 has been cancelled, therefore the final sample of 
all Italian ASOs established in 2010 and active actually includes only 67 firms. Bivariate Correlation Analysis using 
Pearson’s coefficient and other descriptive statistics have been used to process the variables. Firm performance was 
measured through the most important accounting-based performance indexes, obtained from the annual report in the 
period 2014: economic performance refers some important profit margin and the ability of firm to extract value from 
commercial activities (ROS), from investments into the main business (ROA) and the final profitability (ROE); 
financial structure has been measured by leverage ratio and the Net financial position (NFP). Variables related to the 
governance features (Table1) include the ownership structure, the composition of the board of directors, CEO 
duality and the distribution of the power from the academic-inventor to outside managers, measured through a 
dummy variable referred to the presence of academic inventor as chair of the board of directors (1,0). The mixed 
nature of the ownership structure refer to the presence of different strategic stakeholders  such as university 
(Parentshare) and other firms (Firmshare). A dummy variable capture their presence in the sample. For the board of 
directors the analysis considers the number of female managers (Wobo), the number of outside managers (Outbo) 
and the number of academic researcher (sharebo) within the managerial team. Finally, the presence of CEO duality 
practice was measured through a dummy variable. Control variables related to productivity index, size of the board, 
the size of the firm,  industry, ownership concentration and affiliation have been considered. For the productivity 
measure the analysis considers the assets turnover ratio (ROCI) used as indicator of efficiency of commercial 
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activity. For the size of the firm, considering the irrelevant number of employees, the analysis refers this variable 
only to sales and investments; investments and sales are associated generally to industry, for this reason the study 
considers the potential discriminant effect of life sciences industry on economic and financial performance. Life 
sciences sector comprises a science-based business (biology, biotechnology, biomedical research, biochemistry), 
characterized by enterprises that create a research generally at an early stage of development with a potential market 
value that will be disclose during the time. This kind of business requires several capital, strong market alliances, 
specific business skills. However, institutional investors generally prefer invest during the development phase, when 
the uncertainty decreases. For this reason, this study considers the relation of life sciences industry with the ASOs 
performance, measuring with 1 the presence of the firm in this sector. Ownership concentration express the power 
concentration in term of percentage of equity referred to the main shareholder, while the affiliation refers to the 
presence of subsidiaries of ASO. Table 1 shows these variables 
 
Table 1. Variables. 
 Description  Measure  
Wobo Presence  of female manager No. 
CEOdual Presence of  CEO duality 1,0 
Sharebo Presence of academic researcher into the board of 
directors 
No. 
Outbo Presence of outside manager No. 
Headac Presence of academic inventor as chair of the board 
of director 
1,0 
Firmshare Presence of  other firms as shareholders 1,0 
Parentshare Presence of university as shareholders 1,0 
ROS EBIT/Sales Percentage 
ROA EBIT/Assets Percentage 
ROE Net income/Equity Percentage 
Profit Net income Value in Euro 
EBITDA Net operating profit Value in Euro 
NFP Net financial position Value in Euro 
Leverage Debts/Equity Absolute value 
ROCI Revenue/Assets Absolute value 
Industry  Presence of ASO in life science sector 1,0 
Firmsize Volume of investments and volume of sales Value in Euro 
Boardsize Number of Managers  No. 
Ownership Main equity share Percentage 
Sharesize Number of shareholders No. 
Affiliated Presence of ASOs investees in other firms 1,0 
 
5. Results: descriptive statistics and correlations 
The final sample presents a homogeneous territorial distribution of ASO: 27 firms are located  into the South, 24 
in the North area and only 16 in the central area of Italy. Life sciences industry is the most populous (31%), 
followed by ICT (22%) and the energy-environment applications (13%). Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of the 
numeric variables. The sample has a high number of firms (88%) in which the academic researchers are present in 
the board; however, it is observed that more than half of the companies (52%) has an external manager the board of 
directors. This data confirms the theoretical assumptions: the academic-owner does not give up decision-making and 
operational roles even when needs further reinforcement of management skills. Analyzing in detail the composition 
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of the board, on average they are made up of three members, a size very common for SMEs; moreover, even if 
present in many companies in the sample, the external managers are very few within the board, an average of 1, so 
as it is reduced the number of women. Specifically, only 31% of firms in the sample involving women in 
management positions. The ownership structure of the academic spin-off has on average five shareholders, in 42% 
of cases represented by other firms and 31% from university. This shows that although it has passed the start-up 
phase, the parent organization maintains its presence and its support for the ASO. University share owner is often 
modest, this situation confirms that the parent organizations provide support in term of facilities and scientific 
equipment, technical staff and scientific collaborations, that play a strategic role for the development of ASO. 
Among the shareholders companies, only in 3 cases appear financial investors such as banks and venture capitalists. 
This also confirms the findings in the literature: the difficulty of attracting capital where the management is too 
biased towards the academic component. In such cases, the board presents non-academic managers, as 
representative of the financial investors. The percentage of spin-off with investments on the equity in other 
companies is very low (31%), demonstrating the reduced nature of the business network. The anomaly is the fact 
that these affiliations are often other individual firms of the academic-founder or even family businesses. CEO 
duality is a common practice within the sample (51%) but even more striking is the presence of the academic-
inventor, chair of the board of directors. This role is an expression of the maximum control and power over 
decision-making and operating activity in the company, therefore its coincidence with the author of the technology 
transfer through the creation of the company appears to confirm the will to not give up the exercise of power 
although the academic-inventor continues to hold faculty positions that often make it difficult to combine the two 
activities. Table 3 presents the value of accounting-based performance measures: data on sales and investments 
confirm the small and medium size of these firms: turnover is between a minimum of 400 euro to a maximum of 
800.000 Euros, only 3 companies detect a turnover of over one million Euros; so too the volume of investments 
ranging from a minimum of 10.000 euros to a maximum of 800.000 euros, with two cases of over one million Euros. 
On average, the sample has a negative economic performance, both in terms of net income and EBITDA, 
confirming the disappointing performance and the difficulty to undertake the growth. Also in terms of financial 
values the firms have strong imbalances expressed by a high leverage ratio and a negative net financial position, 
often symptoms of severe liquidity strains even in the short term. In fact, the low turnover of assets shows the 
difficulties of ASOs to recover gradually investments through revenue.   
 
Table 2 – Descriptive statistics  
 
Variables Min Max Mean Standard Deviation 
Wobo ,00 2,00 ,3582 ,56946 
Sharebo ,00 5,00 1,9403 1,30129 
Outbo ,00 6,00 ,9104 1,20267 
ROS -11,69 16,93 2,5591 6,26275 
ROA -61,67 61,75 1,5763 15,55832 
ROE -49,62 66,47 5,4292 17,66592 
Profit -164178,25 127705,50 -1747,3769 43095,96043 
EBITDA -150670,25 217443,00 10775,4366 50664,88893 
NFP -476077,00 846122,25 -17499,2052 139446,02997 
Leverage ,00 135,00 6,8088 16,71112 
ROCI ,00 2,72 ,6212 ,54788 
Assets 32,25 3038511,25 249755,582 458953,44162 
Sales ,00 5690238,50 248169,973 796114,70116 
Boardsize 1,00 9,00 2,9403 1,84949 
Ownership ,00 100,00 48,2687 26,44295 
Sharesize ,00 16,00 5,0597 3,30234 
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Affiliated ,00 2,00 ,6134 ,46739 
 
Correlation analysis (Table 3) shows a positive relation between CEO Duality practice and the mean value of net 
income that assume a negative value during the period observed. This situation highlights, therefore, that in presence 
of CEO duality increases the negative income of ASO (Hp1); there are no significant relations between other 
performance measures and CEO duality. This practice is negatively correlated to the presence of outside managers, 
as well as the board size and the ownership structure. The presence of institutional investors, as other companies and 
venture capitals, in the ownership structure reduces the tendency to concentrate the power in one person, imposing 
the division of it between the different members of the board. The presence of academic-researchers into the board 
of directors is positively correlated with the presence of the university, while it is negatively linked to higher rates of 
ownership concentration of equity. This suggests that where the equity is diluted among a larger number of 
shareholders, board members open to outside managers. A Board with academic-researchers is negatively correlated 
to ROS, while is positively related to the volume of investments (Hp2). Also, the presence of women within the 
board is negatively correlated to ROS. Female managers are more present in larger board. This situation confirms 
the idea that academics have a generally weak market orientation and its business struggling to find commercial 
applications. Indeed, outside managers are more present where there are institutional investors, represented by firms 
and university. Furthermore, the presence of outside managers affected by the specificities of the sector, being 
positively correlated with the presence of companies belonging to the life sciences industry. This seems logical and 
confirms the position of literature that considers the external manager gives competence lacking the academic 
founder, which in the case of life sciences is generally far from the managerial skills. Considering the negative value 
of the economic performance measures (EBITDA, Profit), the negative relationship between these indicators and the 
presence of external managers confirms the hypothesis that these parties allow the ASO to achieve better 
performance (Hp3). More ambiguous is the negative relationship between ROE and outside managers. From the 
point of view of the consolidation of equity and debt exposure, the statistics confirm that leverage ratio decreases in 
presence of outside managers. However, this positive impact on financial structure is mitigated considering the low 
use of outside managers within the sample. Considering the ownership structure, there is a negative relation between 
mixed structure (parent organization, academic-founder, other firms..) and economic performance measured by 
ROA and ROE. This situation does not confirm the hp4, belief that management skills are more incisive on the 
economic performance of ASO, while the ability of attracting institutional investors or to retain the support of its 
parent organization is not significant. No relationship is found between the mixed ownership structure and financial 
performance. Ownership concentration is positively linked to leverage and negatively impact on profit margin. 
Among control variables in presence of larger board there is a negative net operating profit (EBITDA), while is 
absent the CEO duality practice. Also industry variable negatively affects economic performance, in particular ROE 
and the turnover of investments through sales (ROCI), which taking negative values for ASOs in the field of life 
sciences (Table 4), while is related in a positive way to leverage ratio, confirming the literature that assumes the 
high level of financial resources absorbed in this sectors. 
Table 3 – Correlation analysis 
   Firmsh Parentsh ownership Boardsize Wobo Outbo 
Ceodua
l 
 
Shareb Headac 
Firmshare Pearson 
Correlation    ,407(**)  ,469(**) -,255(*) 
  
  Sig. (2-
queues)    ,001  ,000 ,037 
  
  No.    67  67 67   
Parentshare Pearson 
Correlation    ,554(**)  ,486(**)  
 ,466 
(**) 
  Sig. (2-
queues)    ,000  ,000  
 ,000 
  No.    67  67   67 
Ownership Pearson 
Correlation        
 -,630 
(**) 
  Sig. (2-
queues)        
 ,000 
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  No.         67 
Boardsize Pearson 
Correlation ,407(**) ,554(**)   ,280(*) ,726(**) 
-
,650(**
) 
 
 
  Sig. (2-
queues) ,001 ,000   ,022 ,000 ,000 
  
  No. 67 67   67 67 67   
Wobo Pearson 
Correlation    ,280(*)    
  
  Sig. (2-
queues)    ,022    
  
  No.    67      
Outbo Pearson 
Correlation ,469(**) ,486(**)  ,726(**)   
-
,399(**
) 
 
 
  Sig. (2-
queues) ,000 ,000  ,000   ,001 
  
  No. 67 67  67   67   
Ceodual Pearson 
Correlation -,255(*)   -,650(**)  -,399(**)  
  
  Sig. (2-
queues) ,037   ,000  ,001  
  
  No. 67   67  67    
Headac Pearson 
Correlation        
  
  Sig. (2-
queues)        
  
  No.          
EBITDA Pearson 
Correlation    -,406(**)  -,505(**)  
  
  Sig. (2-
queues)    ,001  ,000  
  
  No.    67  67    
Profit Pearson 
Correlation   -,309(*)   -,263(*) ,281(*) 
  
  Sig. (2-
queues)   ,011   ,031 ,021 
  
  No.   67   67 67   
Assets Pearson 
Correlation        
,622(**
) -,257(*) 
  Sig. (2-
queues)        ,000 ,036 
  No.        67 67 
ROS Pearson 
Correlation     -,324 (**)   
-
,350(**
) 
 
  Sig. (2-
queues)     ,007   ,004  
  No.     67   67  
ROA Pearson 
Correlation 
-
,333(**
) 
      
 
 
  Sig. (2-
queues) ,006       
  
  No. 67         
ROE Pearson 
Correlation 
-
,341(**
) 
    -,250(*)  
 
 
  Sig. (2-
queues) ,005     ,042  
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  No. 67     67    
ROCI Pearson 
Correlation      -,289(*)  
  
  Sig. (2-
queues)      ,018  
  
  No.      67    
Leverage Pearson 
Correlation   ,273(*)   -,459(*)  
  
  Sig. (2-
queues)   ,026   ,005  
  
  No.   67   67    
**  Correlation is significant at level 0,01 (2-queues). 
*  Correlation is significant at level 0,05 (2-queues). 
Tab. 4 Correlation analysis 
   Industry 
ROCI Pearson 
Correlation -,348(**) 
  Sig. (2-
queues) ,004 
  No. 67 
ROE Pearson 
Correlation -,441(**) 
  Sig. (2-
queues) ,000 
  No. 67 
 Leverage Pearson 
Correlation ,321(**) 
 Sig. (2-
queues) ,008 
 No. 67 
 
6. Conclusions 
This research proposed to test resource dependency theory to interpret the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance outside of the traditional SMEs, considering the ambiguous nature of ASOs 
Albeit with limits of the sample, the research findings can respond to different research questions. Results suggest 
the ambivalent effects of mixed ownership structure with reference to access problems to strategic resources, but 
confirm that CEO duality and board with academic-researchers do not enhance firm performance, especially the 
operating profitability. Firms in our sample have the capital concentrated in the hands of few or several researchers 
linked by scientific ties and strong alliances with their parent organizations that assure their support over the start-up 
phase. The presence of financial actors, such as venture capitalists, in the social structure is modest, practically 
absent in the major part of the sample and this phenomenon is linked to board composition. The small size of Italian 
ASOs can justify the prevailing managerial role of academic-founder in the board, but it is associated to negative 
performance; however, the presence of outside executive managers in the half of the sample shows that the spin-off 
have the awareness to elevate managerial skills inserting external managers, accessing external resources and 
managing the interdependencies with other organizations that financing the spin offs. Critical resources to growth 
are the managers. In ASOs the corporate governance systems it should be structured on two levels: an organ not 
necessary the board of directors, that makes up the interests of private and public stakeholders; a body, not necessary 
the CEO, which manages the business. It could also be individual bodies (CEO, executive managers, academic-
founder). At least, two factors influence the effectiveness of the adopted solution: the nature of the stakeholders in 
the social structure; the degree of complementarity among the managerial skills. To these, this research add the 
influence of the industrial factors and its competitive dynamics and technology. Therefore, the need to access to 
421 Daniela Di Berardino /  Procedia Economics and Finance  39 ( 2016 )  412 – 421 
strategic resources, address the ASOs to recombine during the time, the connections with a network of scientific and 
managerial skills, in order to increase their level of performance. Resource dependency theory appears promising. 
Future research may consider other performance measure, such as the innovation, revenue from patents and 
organizational efficiency. 
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